The artificial noise (AN) scheme, proposed by Goel and Negi, is being considered as one of the key enabling technology for secure communications over MIMO wiretap channels. However, the decrease in secrecy rate due to the increase in the number of Eve's antennas is not well understood. In this paper, we develop an analytical framework to characterize the secrecy rate of the AN scheme as a function of Eve's SNR, Bob's SNR, the number of antennas in each terminal, and the power allocation scheme. We first derive a closed-form expression for the average secrecy rate. We then derive a closed-form expression for the asymptotic instantaneous secrecy rate with large number of antennas at all terminals. Finally, we derive simple lower and upper bounds on the average/instantaneous secrecy rate that provide a tool for the system design.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of data transmissions is a fundamental issue in wireless communication systems, where the broadcast characteristics make it difficult to prevent eavesdropping. Traditional key-based cryptography [1] [2] [3] usually is based on the assumption that the eavesdropper (Eve) has limited computational resources.
These algorithms ensure that it is computational infeasible to decipher the encrypted messages without knowledge of the secret key. On the other hand, assuming Eve has unlimited computational power, Wyner, in [4] , analyzed how one can reliably send information over a discrete memoryless wiretap channel. Wyner showed that, if Eve intercepts a degraded version of the intended receiver's (Bob's) signal, the transmitter (Alice) can limit the information leakage by means of channel coding. The associated notion of secrecy capacity was introduced to characterize the maximum transmission rate from Alice to Bob, below which Eve is unable to obtain any information.
Wyner's original work provided the theoretical foundation for keyless security, namely physical layer security. Several studies have been made to generalize Wyner's wiretap channel model. For example, in [5] , Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman studied the Gaussian wiretap channel and showed that a positive secrecy capacity exists only when Eve's channel is of lower quality than that of Bob. In [6] , the authors considered a non-degraded version of Wyner's wiretap channel. The notion of wiretap channel has also been extended to fading channels. For quasi-static fading channels, the outage probability of secrecy capacity is derived in [7] . For the ergodic fading channel, [8] provides a detailed analysis of secrecy capacity. In [9] , the secrecy capacity region of a multiple-access channel with confidential messages is derived. The secure transmissions over multiple-output multiple-input (MIMO) wiretap channels are studied in [10] . The achievable average secrecy rate has been widely adopted as a metric of security [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] .
In the context of wiretap code design, Csiszár [12] proposed the strong secrecy criterion, i.e., lim n→∞ I(u; y) = 0, which implies that the overall information leakage between the message u and Eve's channel output y should vanish as the codeword length n tends to infinity. Polar codes achieving strong secrecy over discrete memoryless channels have been proposed in [13] . For Gaussian wiretap channels, nested lattice codes achieving strong secrecy were proposed in [14] . In particular, polar codes in [13] and lattice codes in [14] were shown to achieve semantic security [2] . In [15] , Oggier et al. showed that it is possible to construct lattice codes that maximizes Eve's error probability.
Instead of only relying on the randomness of communication channels, physical layer jamming techniques were proposed to increase secrecy rate. In [11] , Goel and Negi showed that it is possible to align additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), so called "artificial noise" (AN), within the null space of a MIMO channel between Alice and Bob, thus only Eve is jammed. The idea of AN has been extended to various system models [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . When the number of Bob's antennas N B is one, the asymptotic analysis of the secrecy capacity was derived in [16] , and its power allocation scheme was presented in [17] . In the case of imperfect channel state information, an average minimum mean square (MSE) uplink-downlink duality was derived in [18] . More recently, we have shown that Eve's error probability can be maximized by any randomly distributed AN (not necessarily Gaussian) [19] . In the existing AN-based schemes, it is commonly assumed that the number of Eve's antennas N E is smaller than the number of Alice's antennas N A , i.e., N E < N A [11, 17, 20] . However, the relationship between the secrecy rate and unbounded N E has never been explored.
In this work, we characterize the exact secrecy rate of the original AN scheme [11] for any Eve-toBob channel noise-power ratios using various AN power allocation schemes, with arbitrary number of antennas at each terminal. Our contributions are three-fold: firstly, we derive a closed-form expression for the average secrecy rate; secondly, we derive a closed-form expression for the asymptotic instantaneous secrecy rate as the number of antennas in each terminal becomes large; and finally, we derive lower and upper bounds on the average/instantaneous secrecy rate, leading to simple sufficient and necessary conditions that guarantee positive average/instantaneous secrecy rate.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the system model, followed by the analysis of secrecy rate in Section III. Section IV provides lower and upper bounds on the secrecy rate. Conclusions are drawn in Section V. Proofs of the theorems are given in Appendix.
Notation: Matrices and column vectors are denoted by upper and lowercase boldface letters, and the Hermitian transpose, inverse, pseudoinverse of a matrix B by B H , B −1 , and B † , respectively. |B| denotes the determinant of B. Let the random variables {X n } and X be defined on the same probability space. We write X n a.s.
→ X if X n converges to X almost surely or with probability one. I n denotes the identity matrix of size n. An m × n null matrix is denoted by 0 m×n . A circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable x with variance σ 2 is defined as x ∽ N C (0, σ 2 ). The real, complex, integer and complex integer numbers are denoted by R, C, Z and Z [i], respectively. I(x; y) represents the mutual information of two random variables x and y. We use the standard asymptotic notation f (x) = O (g (x)) when lim sup x→∞ |f (x)/g(x)| < ∞. ⌈x⌋ rounds to the closest integer. A central complex Wishart matrix A ∈ C m×m with n degrees of freedom and covariance matrix Σ, is defined as A ∽ W m (n,Σ). We write for equality in definition.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider secure communications over a three-terminal system, including a transmitter (Alice), the intended receiver (Bob), and an unauthorized receiver (Eve), equipped with N A , N B , and N E antennas, respectively. The signal vectors received by Bob and Eve are
where x ∈ C NA×1 is the transmit signal vector, H ∈ C NB×NA and G ∈ C NE×NA are the respective channel matrices between Alice to Bob and Alice to Eve, and n B , n E are AWGN vectors with i.i.d.
and N C (0, σ 2 E ). We assume that the entries of H and G are i.i.d. complex random variables ∼ N C (0, 1).
Without loss of generality, we normalize Bob's channel noise variance to one, i.e.,
and accordingly normalize the total average transmission power E(||x|| 2 ), as in [21] .
A. Artificial Noise Scheme
The AN scheme assumes N B < N A , in order to ensure that H has a non-trivial null space Z = null(H) (such that HZ = 0 NB×(NA−NB) ) [11] . Let H = UΛV H be the singular value decomposition (SVD) of H, then we can write the unitary matrix V as
where the N B columns of V 1 span the orthogonal complement subspace to the null space spanned by the columns of Z.
Using the AN scheme, Alice transmits
where u ∈ C NB×1 is the information vector and v ∈ C (NA−NB)×1 is the "artificial noise". For the purpose of evaluating the achievable secrecy rate, both u and v are assumed to be Gaussian circularly symmetric random vectors with i.i.d. complex entries ∼ N C (0, σ 2 u ) and N C (0, σ 2 v ), respectively. Equations (1) and (2) can then be rewritten as
From (6) and (7), we note that v only degrades Eve's channel, but does not affect Bob.
In our paper, we assume the worst-case scenario for Alice and Bob described in [11] :
• Alice has only the knowledge of H.
• Eve has the knowledge of H, G, Z and V 1 .
Different from [11] , we assume no upper bound on N E .
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We set the average transmit power constraint P ,
where
are fixed by the power allocation scheme that selects the balance between σ 2 u and σ 2 v .
B. Instantaneous and Average Secrecy Capacities
The idea underpinning the AN scheme is to increase secrecy capacity by jamming Eve. We recall from [22] the definition of instantaneous secrecy capacity:
where the maximum is taken over all possible input distributions p (u).
We remark that C S is a function of H and G, which are embedded in z and y. To average out the randomness of C S , we further define the average secrecy capacity, as in [11] C S max
, following the notation in [21] .
Since closed form expressions for C S andC S are not always available (except for the following Theorem 3 given in Sec. III.E), we often resort to the corresponding secrecy rates, given by
assuming Gaussian input alphabets, i.e., v and u are mutually independent Gaussian vectors with i.i.d.
C. System Parameters
We define Bob's and Eve's SNRs as
To simplify our notation, we define three system parameters:
Eve-to-Bob noise-power ratio) Note that SNR B = αγ. If γ > 1, we say Eve has a degraded channel. Since we have normalized σ 2 B to one, we can write (10) as
III. SECRECY RATE WITH GAUSSIAN INPUT ALPHABETS
In this section, we first derive a closed-form expression for the average secrecy rate in (14) with Gaussian input alphabets. We then present an asymptotic analysis on the instantaneous secrecy rate in (13) . Finally, we show average secrecy capacity in (12) is achieved with Gaussian input alphabets when
To present our result, we define some useful functions.
A. Definitions
We first define the following function (see [23] )
We further define
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Finally, we define a set of N A power ratios {θ i } NA 1 , where
B. Average Secrecy Rate
A closed-form expression forR S in (14) 
where Θ(·, ·, ·) is given in (15),
and µ 1 > µ 2 are the two distinct eigenvalues of the matrix diag θ
, with corresponding multiplicities m 1 and m 2 such that m 1 + m 2 = N A . The matrix R (k) has elements
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 gives the exact value ofR S for the AN scheme, as a function of SNR B (αγ), SNR E (α), power allocation scheme (β), N A , N B and N E . Note that (22) can be expressed in terms of a finite number of incomplete Gamma functions, thus provides a closed-form expression forR S .
C. Asymptotic Instantaneous Secrecy Rate
The instantaneous secrecy rate R S in (13) is a function of H, V and G. Since we assumed that the realizations of H, V and G are known to Eve, she is able to compute the exact value of R S . However, Alice only knows the realizations of H and V, and can only assume that G is a random matrix. Therefore, R S is a random variable from Alice's perspective. We will consider this point of view when designing the secure communications system and we will use random matrix theory to characterize the asymptotic behavior (in terms of number of antennas) of the normalized instantaneous secrecy rate R S /N B . We then show by simulation that the asymptotic behavior is a very accurate approximation even for very small numbers of antennas.
The following theorem proves that R S /N B converges to a constant value, which depends only of the system parameters: α, β, γ, P u , P v , and the asymptotic number of antenna ratios. A special case of this result for β = 1 was given in [25] . Here, we provide a unified result for arbitrary β.
Theorem 2: As
and δ is the solution of the equation
Proof: See Appendix B.
In the special case of β = 1, according to the definitions of P u and P v given in Sec. II.C, we have
According to [26, Eq. 2 .121], the explicit solution of (30) is
By substituting (32) and (33) into (26), we have
which coincides with [25, Th. 3] .
D. Asymptotic Approximation of Average Secrecy Rate
Theorem 2 shows that the random variable R S /N B converges almost surely to a constant Ψ given in (26) , as the number of antennas at each terminal goes to infinity. Hence, also the average normalized secrecy rate converges to the same constant, as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1:
Under the same assumptions of Theorem 2,
where Ψ is given in (26) . Then we can write that
for a sufficiently large number of antennas.
Proof: The proof is straightforward. Corollary 1 provides an alternative way to evaluateR S . To use the asymptotic approximationR S,Asym for a finite system model, we substitute in Ψ
Remark 1: For finite system models, we verified by simulations that the difference betweenR S and
Example 1: Let us apply Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 to the analysis of an AN scheme with N A = 6, N B = 3 and α = 3 dB. Fig. 1 shows the value ofR S with β = −3 dB, as a function of γ and N E .
In Fig. 2 , we fix γ = 3 dB and verify the relationship between β, N E andR S . Both figures show an excellent agreement between the theoretically derivedR S and Monte Carlo simulation and the asymptotic approximationR S,Asym .
Moreover, Fig. 1 shows howR S increases with increasing γ and decreases with increasing N E . In Fig. 2 , we observe that increasing β (i.e., increasing AN power) has little effect on increasingR S when
E. Achieving Average Secrecy Capacity
The following theorem gives a sufficient condition for the achievability of the average secrecy capacity (12) using Gaussian input alphabets. 
Theorem 3:
whereC Bob represents Bob's average channel capacity.
Proof: See Appendix C.
According to (12) , a universal upper bound on the average MIMO secrecy capacity is given bȳ
Remark 2: Combining (39) and (40), we can show that the maximum average MIMO secrecy capacity is achieved by using the AN transmission scheme and Gaussian input alphabets, if N E is not larger that
IV. LOWER AND UPPER BOUNDS ON SECRECY RATE
To guarantee positive average/instantaneous secrecy rate, in this section, we present simple sufficient and necessary conditions, based upon lower and upper bounds on the average/instantaneous secrecy rate using Gaussian input alphabets.
A. Bounds on Average Secrecy Rate
The following theorem boundsR S given in (22) . where the equality holds if β = 1,
θ min min{α, αβ},
and Θ(·, ·, ·) is given in (15) .
Proof: See Appendix D.
Example 2: Fig. 3 compares the values ofR S ,R UB ,R LB as functions of N E with α = 3 dB, β = 1 dB, γ = 6 dB, N B = 3 and N A = 4. Note that the upper and lower bounds are become tighter as β approaches 0 dB.
B. Bounds on Instantaneous Secrecy Rate
We then provide lower and upper bounds on the instantaneous secrecy rate R S in (13) for high SNR B .
and let P u , P v → ∞, then almost surely (i.e., with probability one)
where the equality (i.e., almost sure convergence to ∆(·)) holds if β = 1,
Proof: See Appendix E.
C. Sufficient and Necessary Conditions forR S , R S > 0
Theorem 5 shows that the random variable R S /N B is almost surely bounded by the constant values ∆(A max ) and ∆(A min ) given in (50). Then the average normalized secrecy rate is also bounded by the same values, as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 2:
Under the same assumptions of Theorem 5,
where ∆(·) is given in (47). The equality holds if β = 1.
Proof:
The proof is straightforward.
The bounds in (45) and (50) enable the following simple sufficient and necessary conditions for positive instantaneous and average secrecy rate. 
and a necessary condition for positive instantaneous and average secrecy rate is given by
where ∆(·) is given in (47).
Proof: The proof is straightforward.
To use Corollary 3 for finite (relatively small) SNR B and number of antennas, we substitute in ∆(·)
Thus ∆(·) reduces to a function of N A , N B , N E , α, β and γ.
Remark 3:
We verified by simulation that Corollary 3 is accurate for finite system models, when
Example 3: We consider an AN scheme with N A = 6, N B = 3, α = γ = 3 dB and β = 1 dB. Compared to the expressions in Theorems 1 and 2, the sufficient and necessary conditions for positive average/instantaneous secrecy rate in Corollary 3 are much easier to compute, and can be used for system design. For example, from Alice's perspective, given N A , N B , α, β and γ, she can easily predict the number of antennas Eve needs to drive the secrecy rate to zero.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the artificial noise scheme in a situation where Eve has unlimited number of antennas. We derived closed-form expressions for the average secrecy rate and the asymptotic instantaneous secrecy rate. The proposed analysis allows a simple evaluation on the secrecy rate with any SNR B , SNR E , N A , N B and N E , and extends previous studies that were limited to either the case of N E < N A or the case of N B = 1. In the second part of this paper, we have derived lower and upper bounds on the average/instantaneous secrecy rate. Moreover, simple sufficient and necessary conditions for positive average and instantaneous secrecy rate have been derived. These easily computable conditions provide Alice and Eve with design tools for choosing system parameters.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Theorem 1
Recalling thatR S = I(u; z|H)−I(u; y|H, G).
In what follows, we evaluate I(u; z|H) and I(u; y|H, G), respectively. We treat H and G as Gaussian random matrices.
1) I(u; z|H)
Since (HV 
where Θ(x, y, z) is given in (15) .
2) I(u; y|H, G)
Since all entries in H and G are mutually independent, I(u; y) can be expressed as a function of these independent random entries. This allows us to take two steps to compute the expected value of I(u; y): we first compute I(u; y|G) given H, then compute E H [I(u; y|G)|H]. The advantage is that for given H, V = [V 1 , Z] is a fixed unitary matrix. Then, using [27, Th. 1], GV 1 and GZ are mutually independent complex Gaussian random matrices with i.i.d. entries ∼ N C (0, 1) .
According to [21] , for given H, we have
According to [21, Th. 2] and [23, Th. 1], the second term of (57) equals to
where Θ(x, y, z), N min and N max are given in (15), (17) and (18), respectively.
To compute the first term of (57), we rewrite αW 1 +αβW 2 as G 3 ∆G H 3 , where
θ i is defined in (21) . We define 
where G 3 ,N min andN max are given in (59), (19) and (20), respectively. have
where K and R (k) are given in (24) and (25), respectively.
Based on (57), (58), (62) and (63), we have
By substituting (64) and (56) into (55), we havē
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Recalling that
In what follows, we evaluate I(u; z) and I(u; y), respectively.
1) I(u; z)
Similarly to (56), we have
Since Alice knows the realization of H, she is able to compute the deterministic value of I(u; z). As N A and N B → ∞ with N A /N B → β 2 , the following limit holds [26, Eq. 1.14]
where Φ (x, y) is given in (27) .
2) I(u; y)
Similarly to (57), we have
where According to [26, Eq. 1.14] , as N A − N B and N E → ∞ with N A /N E → β 1 and N B /N E → β 3 , i.e.,
Let W 3 = αW 1 +αβW 2 . We can rewrite W 3 asĜ 3 TĜ H 3 , wherê
where the θ i 's are given in (21) . Note that the entries ofĜ 3 are i.i.d. complex random variables ∼ N C (0,
According to [26, Th. 2.39] , as N A and
where V(δ) is given in (29) and δ satisfies
with η(δ) given in (31).
From (68), (70) and (73) 
where the constant Ψ is given in (26) .
C. Proof of Theorem 3
We first show that using Gaussian input alphabets, if N E ≤ N A −N B , I(u; y|H, G) → 0 as α, β → ∞.
We follow the definitions in the proof of Theorem 1. Based on (57), for a given realization of H, we have I(u; y|G)
where (a) holds due to the concavity of log-determinant function and Jensen's inequality.
Recalling the definitions of α and β in Sec. II.C, and based on Sylvester's determinant theorem and [23, Th. 1], the first term of (76) can be rewritten as
From (76) and (77), we have
Based on (78), if N min = N E , i.e., N E ≤ N A − N B , as α and β → ∞,
Under the same conditions, by substituting (79) into (14), we havē On the other hand, from (12), we havē
Based on (80) and (81), as α,
D. Proof of Theorem 4
We follow the definitions in the proof of Theorem 1. We first bound the term Ω in the expression of R S given in (26) . Recalling that
Let θ min = min{α, αβ} and θ max = max{α, αβ}. Since W 1 and W 2 are positive semidefinite matrices, using [28, Eq. 12, pp. 55], we have
and
where G 3 ,N min andN max are given in (59), (19) and (20), respectively. The equality holds if β = 1. 
By substituting (86) into (22), we haveR
E. Proof of Theorem 5
We follow the definitions in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 4. Based on (67), (69), (84) 
The equality of the random variables R S = R LB = R UB holds if β = 1, since θ min = θ max .
We then evaluate R LB and R UB . For convenience, we define
Similarly to the proof in Theorem 2, using [26, Eq. → Φ (P u , β 2 ) ,
log |I NE +αβW 2 | N E a.s.
We then evaluate the function Φ (x, y). From (27) , since F (x, y) = F xy, y −1 , it is easy to show 
Using (95) and (96), we have the following results on the non random quantities Φ(P u , β 2 ), Φ(P v /(γρ), ρ), Φ (A max , β 1 ) and Φ (A min , β 1 ).
Since β 
Using (89), (90) and (104), under the above conditions, we have (45).
